CELTIC
CORNER:
The Truce-
an uneasy peace
The war ended in a Truce on July 11, 1921. In some
respects, the conflict was at a stalemate. Talks that had looked promising the
previous year had petered out in December when Lloyd George insisted that the
IRA first surrender their arms. Fresh talks, after the Prime Minister had come
under pressure from Hebert Henry Asquith and the Liberal opposition the Labour
Party and the Trades Union Congress, resumed in the spring and resulted in the
Truce. From the point of view of the British government it appeared as if the
IRA’s guerilla campaign would continue indefinitely, with spiraling costs in
British casualties and in money. More importantly, the British government was
facing severe criticism at home and abroad for the actions of Crown Forces in
Ireland. On the other side, IRA leaders and in particular Michael Collins, felt
that the IRA, as it was then organized, could not continue indefinitely. It had
been hard pressed by the deployment of more regular British soldiers into
Ireland and by the lack of arms and ammunition.
The initial breakthrough that led to
the Truce was credited to three people: King George V, General Jan Smuts of
South Africa and British Prime Minister David Lloyd Georg. The King, who had
made his unhappiness at the behavior of the Black and Tans in Ireland well
known to his government, was unhappy at the official speech prepared for him
for the opening of the new Parliament of Northern Ireland created through the
partition of Ireland. Smuts, a close friend of the King, suggested to him that
the opportunity should be used to make an appeal for reconciliation in Ireland.
The King asked him to draft his ideas on paper. Smuts prepared this draft and
gave copies to the King and to Lloyd Georg. Lloyd George then invited Smuts to
attend a British cabinet meeting convened to hold consultations on the
interesting proposals Lloyd George had received, without either man informing
the Cabinet that Smuts had been their author. Faced with the endorsement of
them by Smuts, the King and the Prime Minister, ministers reluctantly agreed to
the King’s planned ‘reconciliation in Ireland’ speech.
The speech, when delivered, had a massive impact.
Seizing the momentum Lloyd George then issued an appeal for talks to Eamon de
Valera in July 1921, The Irish, (unaware of the extent to which the speech did
not fully represent the views of all the British government, but was to a
significant degree a ‘peace move’ engineered by the King, Smuts and Lloyd
George and reluctantly consented to in cabinet), responded by agreeing to
talks. De Valera and Lloyd George ultimately agreed to a truce that was
intended to end the fighting and lay the ground for detailed negotiations.
These were delayed for some months as the British government insisted that the
IRA first decommission its weapons, but this demand was eventually dropped. It
was agreed that British troops would remain confined to their barracks. Most
IRA officers on the ground interpreted the Truce merely as a temporary respite
and continued recruiting and training volunteers. The continuing militancy of
many IRA leaders was one of the
main factors in the outbreak of the Irish Civil War as they refused to accept
the Anglo-Irish Treaty that Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith negotiated with
the British.
The Treaty
Ultimately, the peace talks led to the
negotiation of the Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921), which was then triply
ratified:-by Dail Eireann in December 1921 (so giving it legal legitimacy under
the governmental system of the Irish Republic) by the House of Commons of Southern
Ireland in January 1922, so giving it constitutional legitimacy according to
British theory of who was the legal government in Ireland), and by both Houses
of the British parliament.
The Treaty allowed Northern Ireland,
which had been created by the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, to opt out of
the Free State if it wished; it duly did so under the procedures laid down. As
agreed, an Irish Boundary Commission was than created to decide on the precise
location of the border of the Free State and Northern Ireland. The Irish negotiators
understood that the Commission would redraw the border according to local
nationalist or unionist majorities. Since the 1920 local elections in Ireland
had resulted in outright nationalist majorities in County Fermanagh, County
Tyrone, the City of Derry and in many District Electoral Divisions of county
Armagh and County Derry (all north and west of the interim border), this might
well have left Northern Ireland unviable. However, the Commission chose to
leave the border unchanged.
A new system of government was created
for the Irish Free Sate, though for the first year two governments co-existed:
an Aireacht answerable to the Dail and headed by President Griffith, and a
Provisional Government nominally answerable to the House of Commons of Southern
Ireland and appointed by the Lord Lieutenant. (The complexity of this was even
shown in the matter by which Lord FitzAlan ‘appointed’ Collins as head of the
Provisional Government. In British theory, they met to allow Collins to ‘Kiss
Hands’. In Irish theory they met to allow Collins take the surrender of Dublin
Castle). Most of the Irish independence movement’s leaders were willing to
accept this compromise, at least for the time being, though many militant
Republicans were not. A minority of those involved in the War of Independence,
led by resigned president Eamon de Valera, refused to accept the Treaty and
started an insurrection against the new Free State government, which it accused
of betraying the ideal of the Irish Republic.
Frank Darcy
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